Outline of a Non-Deliberative, Mood-Based, Theory of Action
(2017) In Philosophia 45(4). p.1527-1539- Abstract
- In a series of famous experiments, Benjamin Libet claimed to have shown that there is no scientific basis for our commonsensical understanding of freedom of the will. The actions we are about to undertake register in our brains before they register in our conscious minds. And yet, all that Libet may have shown is that long-invoked notions such as “the will” and “freedom” are poor explanations of how actions are initiated. Actions take place as we respond to the call of the mood of the situation in which we find ourselves. Action is a way of attuning ourselves. Simple actions happen as long established habits kick in, and complex actions happen as the mood of a situation comes to correspond to the mood of a story we have been telling... (More)
- In a series of famous experiments, Benjamin Libet claimed to have shown that there is no scientific basis for our commonsensical understanding of freedom of the will. The actions we are about to undertake register in our brains before they register in our conscious minds. And yet, all that Libet may have shown is that long-invoked notions such as “the will” and “freedom” are poor explanations of how actions are initiated. Actions take place as we respond to the call of the mood of the situation in which we find ourselves. Action is a way of attuning ourselves. Simple actions happen as long established habits kick in, and complex actions happen as the mood of a situation comes to correspond to the mood of a story we have been telling ourselves. When it feels right, we just act. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1fcd45bc-0f41-4876-91d0-3137c0d653cb
- author
- Ringmar, Erik LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2017-12
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- moods, emotions, Libet, theory of action, readiness potential, precognitive,, moods, action, emotion, narrative, Stimmungen, deliberation
- in
- Philosophia
- volume
- 45
- issue
- 4
- pages
- 1527 - 1539
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85011655324
- pmid:30147179
- ISSN
- 0048-3893
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11406-016-9809-5
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 1fcd45bc-0f41-4876-91d0-3137c0d653cb
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-26 06:01:25
- date last changed
- 2022-04-24 07:02:20
@article{1fcd45bc-0f41-4876-91d0-3137c0d653cb,
abstract = {{In a series of famous experiments, Benjamin Libet claimed to have shown that there is no scientific basis for our commonsensical understanding of freedom of the will. The actions we are about to undertake register in our brains before they register in our conscious minds. And yet, all that Libet may have shown is that long-invoked notions such as “the will” and “freedom” are poor explanations of how actions are initiated. Actions take place as we respond to the call of the mood of the situation in which we find ourselves. Action is a way of attuning ourselves. Simple actions happen as long established habits kick in, and complex actions happen as the mood of a situation comes to correspond to the mood of a story we have been telling ourselves. When it feels right, we just act.}},
author = {{Ringmar, Erik}},
issn = {{0048-3893}},
keywords = {{moods, emotions, Libet, theory of action, readiness potential, precognitive,; moods; action; emotion; narrative; Stimmungen; deliberation}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{4}},
pages = {{1527--1539}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
series = {{Philosophia}},
title = {{Outline of a Non-Deliberative, Mood-Based, Theory of Action}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/21140977/Ringmar_2017_Philosophia.pdf}},
doi = {{10.1007/s11406-016-9809-5}},
volume = {{45}},
year = {{2017}},
}