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Outline of a Non-Deliberative, Mood-Based, Theory of Action

Ringmar, Erik LU (2017) In Philosophia 44(4).
Abstract
In a series of famous experiments, Benjamin Libet claimed to have shown that there is no scientific basis for our commonsensical understanding of freedom of the will. The actions we are about to undertake register in our brains before they register in our conscious minds. And yet, all that Libet may have shown is that long-invoked notions such as “the will” and “freedom” are poor explanations of how actions are initiated. Actions take place as we respond to the call of the mood of the situation in which we find ourselves. Action is a way of attuning ourselves. Simple actions happen as long established habits kick in, and complex actions happen as the mood of a situation comes to correspond to the mood of a story we have been telling... (More)
In a series of famous experiments, Benjamin Libet claimed to have shown that there is no scientific basis for our commonsensical understanding of freedom of the will. The actions we are about to undertake register in our brains before they register in our conscious minds. And yet, all that Libet may have shown is that long-invoked notions such as “the will” and “freedom” are poor explanations of how actions are initiated. Actions take place as we respond to the call of the mood of the situation in which we find ourselves. Action is a way of attuning ourselves. Simple actions happen as long established habits kick in, and complex actions happen as the mood of a situation comes to correspond to the mood of a story we have been telling ourselves. When it feels right, we just act. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
epub
subject
keywords
moods, emotions, Libet, theory of action, readiness potential, precognitive, , moods, action, emotion, narrative, Stimmungen, deliberation
in
Philosophia
volume
44
issue
4
publisher
Springer
external identifiers
  • Scopus:85011655324
ISSN
0048-3893
DOI
10.1007/s11406-016-9809-5
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
1fcd45bc-0f41-4876-91d0-3137c0d653cb
date added to LUP
2016-04-26 06:01:25
date last changed
2017-02-20 09:41:20
@article{1fcd45bc-0f41-4876-91d0-3137c0d653cb,
  abstract     = {In a series of famous experiments, Benjamin Libet claimed to have shown that there is no scientific basis for our commonsensical understanding of freedom of the will. The actions we are about to undertake register in our brains before they register in our conscious minds. And yet, all that Libet may have shown is that long-invoked notions such as “the will” and “freedom” are poor explanations of how actions are initiated. Actions take place as we respond to the call of the mood of the situation in which we find ourselves. Action is a way of attuning ourselves. Simple actions happen as long established habits kick in, and complex actions happen as the mood of a situation comes to correspond to the mood of a story we have been telling ourselves. When it feels right, we just act.},
  author       = {Ringmar, Erik},
  issn         = {0048-3893},
  keyword      = {moods, emotions, Libet, theory of action, readiness potential, precognitive, ,moods,action,emotion,narrative,Stimmungen,deliberation},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {02},
  number       = {4},
  publisher    = {Springer},
  series       = {Philosophia},
  title        = {Outline of a Non-Deliberative, Mood-Based, Theory of Action},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9809-5},
  volume       = {44},
  year         = {2017},
}