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Choice-justifications after allocating resources in helping dilemmas

ERLANDSSON, ARVID LU ; Björklund, Fredrik LU and Bäckström, Martin LU (2017) In Judgment and Decision Making 12(1). p.60-80
Abstract
How do donors reason and justify their choices when faced with dilemmas in a charitable context? In two studies, Swedish students were confronted with helping dilemmas based on the identifiable victim effect, the proportion dominance effect and the ingroup effect. Each dilemma consisted of two comparable charity projects and participants were asked to choose one project over the other. They were then asked to provide justifications of their choice by stating the relative importance of different types of reasons. When faced with an identified victim dilemma, participants did not choose the project including an identified victim more often than the project framed statistically, but those who did emphasized emotional reasons (e.g., “Because I... (More)
How do donors reason and justify their choices when faced with dilemmas in a charitable context? In two studies, Swedish students were confronted with helping dilemmas based on the identifiable victim effect, the proportion dominance effect and the ingroup effect. Each dilemma consisted of two comparable charity projects and participants were asked to choose one project over the other. They were then asked to provide justifications of their choice by stating the relative importance of different types of reasons. When faced with an identified victim dilemma, participants did not choose the project including an identified victim more often than the project framed statistically, but those who did emphasized emotional reasons (e.g., “Because I had more empathic feelings”), but not any other reasons, more than those choosing the statistical project. When faced with a Proportion dominance dilemma, participants more often chose the project with a high rescue proportion (e.g., you can save 100% out of 30) than the project with a low rescue proportion (e.g., you can save 4% out of 800), and those who did emphasized efficacy reasons (e.g., “Because my money can make a greater difference there”), but no other reasons, more than those favoring the low recue proportion project. Finally, when faced with an Ingroup dilemma, participants more often chose the project that could help ingroup-victims over the project that could help outgroup victims, and those who did emphasized responsibility reasons (e.g., “Because I have a greater obligation”), but no other reasons, more than those favoring outgroup projects. These results are consistent with and extend previous findings about how different helping effects are related to different psychological processes. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
charitable giving, choice-justifications, decision modes, helping dilemma, identifiable victim effect, ingroup effect, proportion dominance effect
in
Judgment and Decision Making
volume
12
issue
1
pages
21 pages
publisher
Society for Judgment and Decision Making
external identifiers
  • scopus:85011545386
ISSN
1930-2975
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
2e1a0e6f-2891-4b9d-8c96-9e86c26521c8
alternative location
http://journal.sjdm.org/15/15410/jdm15410.pdf
date added to LUP
2017-02-01 12:50:33
date last changed
2018-05-27 04:39:03
@article{2e1a0e6f-2891-4b9d-8c96-9e86c26521c8,
  abstract     = {How do donors reason and justify their choices when faced with dilemmas in a charitable context? In two studies, Swedish students were confronted with helping dilemmas based on the identifiable victim effect, the proportion dominance effect and the ingroup effect. Each dilemma consisted of two comparable charity projects and participants were asked to choose one project over the other. They were then asked to provide justifications of their choice by stating the relative importance of different types of reasons. When faced with an identified victim dilemma, participants did not choose the project including an identified victim more often than the project framed statistically, but those who did emphasized emotional reasons (e.g., “Because I had more empathic feelings”), but not any other reasons, more than those choosing the statistical project. When faced with a Proportion dominance dilemma, participants more often chose the project with a high rescue proportion (e.g., you can save 100% out of 30) than the project with a low rescue proportion (e.g., you can save 4% out of 800), and those who did emphasized efficacy reasons (e.g., “Because my money can make a greater difference there”), but no other reasons, more than those favoring the low recue proportion project. Finally, when faced with an Ingroup dilemma, participants more often chose the project that could help ingroup-victims over the project that could help outgroup victims, and those who did emphasized responsibility reasons (e.g., “Because I have a greater obligation”), but no other reasons, more than those favoring outgroup projects. These results are consistent with and extend previous findings about how different helping effects are related to different psychological processes.},
  author       = {ERLANDSSON, ARVID and Björklund, Fredrik and Bäckström, Martin},
  issn         = {1930-2975},
  keyword      = {charitable giving,choice-justifications,decision modes,helping dilemma,identifiable victim effect,ingroup effect,proportion dominance effect},
  language     = {eng},
  month        = {01},
  number       = {1},
  pages        = {60--80},
  publisher    = {Society for Judgment and Decision Making},
  series       = {Judgment and Decision Making},
  title        = {Choice-justifications after allocating resources in helping dilemmas},
  volume       = {12},
  year         = {2017},
}