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Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms

Lo Presti, Patrizio LU orcid (2014) In Logos & Episteme: an international journal of epistemiology 5(4). p.445-464
Abstract
Abstract in Undetermined
Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one
doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is
normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is
suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought
not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I
argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we
have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because
violating norms.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Logos & Episteme: an international journal of epistemiology
volume
5
issue
4
pages
445 - 464
publisher
Gheorghe Zane Institute for Economic and Social Research, Romanian Academy, Iasi Branch
ISSN
2069-0533
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
61218548-c2de-4300-b683-7efe14fde9c5 (old id 4856284)
alternative location
http://logos-and-episteme.acadiasi.ro/volume-v-issue-4-december-2014/
date added to LUP
2016-04-04 09:29:59
date last changed
2021-03-29 22:18:13
@article{61218548-c2de-4300-b683-7efe14fde9c5,
  abstract     = {Abstract in Undetermined<br/>Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one<br/>doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is<br/>normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is<br/>suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought<br/>not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I<br/>argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we<br/>have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because<br/>violating norms.},
  author       = {Lo Presti, Patrizio},
  issn         = {2069-0533},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {4},
  pages        = {445--464},
  publisher    = {Gheorghe Zane Institute for Economic and Social Research, Romanian Academy, Iasi Branch},
  series       = {Logos & Episteme: an international journal of epistemiology},
  title        = {Moore's Paradox and Epistemic Norms},
  url          = {https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/5340940/4940928.pdf},
  volume       = {5},
  year         = {2014},
}