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Overlapping Multiple Assignments

Kratz, Jörgen LU (2014) In Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
Abstract
This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers, where a single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the set of agents assigned the object satisfy a compatibility constraint. It is shown that, on the domain of complete, transitive and strict preferences, group-sorting sequential dictatorships are fully characterized by four different combinations of coalitional strategyproofness, strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, group-monotonicity and group-invariance. It is also demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (2001) of sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to overlap is contained in the main... (More)
This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers, where a single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the set of agents assigned the object satisfy a compatibility constraint. It is shown that, on the domain of complete, transitive and strict preferences, group-sorting sequential dictatorships are fully characterized by four different combinations of coalitional strategyproofness, strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, group-monotonicity and group-invariance. It is also demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (2001) of sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to overlap is contained in the main result. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Working Paper
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Multiple assignments, overlapping assignments, sequential dictatorship, strategyproofness, compatibility
in
Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
issue
44
pages
31 pages
publisher
Department of Economics, Lund Universtiy
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
491e6fa0-c01f-42ee-83f9-1c4441be7e3f (old id 4988362)
alternative location
http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2014_044.htm
date added to LUP
2015-01-27 09:12:29
date last changed
2016-04-16 08:24:43
@misc{491e6fa0-c01f-42ee-83f9-1c4441be7e3f,
  abstract     = {This paper studies an allocation problem with multiple assignments, indivisible objects, no endowments and no monetary transfers, where a single object may be assigned to several agents as long as the set of agents assigned the object satisfy a compatibility constraint. It is shown that, on the domain of complete, transitive and strict preferences, group-sorting sequential dictatorships are fully characterized by four different combinations of coalitional strategyproofness, strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, non-bossiness, group-monotonicity and group-invariance. It is also demonstrated that the characterization in Pápai (2001) of sequential dictatorships for the case where assignments are not allowed to overlap is contained in the main result.},
  author       = {Kratz, Jörgen},
  keyword      = {Multiple assignments,overlapping assignments,sequential dictatorship,strategyproofness,compatibility},
  language     = {eng},
  note         = {Working Paper},
  number       = {44},
  pages        = {31},
  publisher    = {Department of Economics, Lund Universtiy},
  series       = {Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University},
  title        = {Overlapping Multiple Assignments},
  year         = {2014},
}