Preferences as Heuristics
(2026) In Working Papers- Abstract
- We present a model of how an individual’s preference for a specific behaviour can
evolve as an adaptation to her social environment. Our key assumptions are that the
decision maker (DM) (i) is boundedly rational in her ability to process information and
evaluate which actions yield the highest payoff and (ii) can develop a subjective prefer-
ence for actions. A stronger preference for an action reduces the probability of not tak-
ing it when it is optimal (omission error), but it also increases the probability of taking
the action when it is suboptimal (commission error). The optimally adapted preference
strikes a balance between these errors and depends on the DM’s environment. DMs are
typically better off... (More) - We present a model of how an individual’s preference for a specific behaviour can
evolve as an adaptation to her social environment. Our key assumptions are that the
decision maker (DM) (i) is boundedly rational in her ability to process information and
evaluate which actions yield the highest payoff and (ii) can develop a subjective prefer-
ence for actions. A stronger preference for an action reduces the probability of not tak-
ing it when it is optimal (omission error), but it also increases the probability of taking
the action when it is suboptimal (commission error). The optimally adapted preference
strikes a balance between these errors and depends on the DM’s environment. DMs are
typically better off (in objective terms) if they are endowed with subjective preferences
that deviate from maximisation of expected objective payoff. Importantly, if DMs can
evaluate actions perfectly, they do not develop such biases. The results extend in an
intuitive manner to n-player, two-strategy supermodular games. Our framework can be
used to interpret preferences for specific actions or strategies (e.g., conditional cooper-
ation, truth-telling, or norm-following) as psychological and cultural consequences of
material incentives and social organisation. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/5e2789d4-c54c-4456-ae22-c4b0206e1842
- author
- Mohlin, Erik LU and Rigos, Alexandros LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2026-09
- type
- Working paper/Preprint
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Preference evolution, Bounded rationality, Culture, Cooperation, Cogni- tive economics, Logit choice, Monotone comparative statics, Supermodular games, C72, C73, D01, D91
- in
- Working Papers
- issue
- 2026:8
- pages
- 57 pages
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 5e2789d4-c54c-4456-ae22-c4b0206e1842
- date added to LUP
- 2026-09-09 12:54:33
- date last changed
- 2026-09-09 12:54:33
@misc{5e2789d4-c54c-4456-ae22-c4b0206e1842,
abstract = {{We present a model of how an individual’s preference for a specific behaviour can<br/>evolve as an adaptation to her social environment. Our key assumptions are that the<br/>decision maker (DM) (i) is boundedly rational in her ability to process information and<br/>evaluate which actions yield the highest payoff and (ii) can develop a subjective prefer-<br/>ence for actions. A stronger preference for an action reduces the probability of not tak-<br/>ing it when it is optimal (omission error), but it also increases the probability of taking<br/>the action when it is suboptimal (commission error). The optimally adapted preference<br/>strikes a balance between these errors and depends on the DM’s environment. DMs are<br/>typically better off (in objective terms) if they are endowed with subjective preferences<br/>that deviate from maximisation of expected objective payoff. Importantly, if DMs can<br/>evaluate actions perfectly, they do not develop such biases. The results extend in an<br/>intuitive manner to n-player, two-strategy supermodular games. Our framework can be<br/>used to interpret preferences for specific actions or strategies (e.g., conditional cooper-<br/>ation, truth-telling, or norm-following) as psychological and cultural consequences of<br/>material incentives and social organisation.}},
author = {{Mohlin, Erik and Rigos, Alexandros}},
keywords = {{Preference evolution; Bounded rationality; Culture; Cooperation; Cogni- tive economics; Logit choice; Monotone comparative statics; Supermodular games; C72; C73; D01; D91}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Working Paper}},
number = {{2026:8}},
series = {{Working Papers}},
title = {{Preferences as Heuristics}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/260381868/WP26_8_cover_combined.pdf}},
year = {{2026}},
}