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The Endogenous Architecture for Two-Sided Matching Markets

Andersson, Tommy LU ; Ehlers, Lars ; Tierney, Ryan and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU (2026) In Working Papers
Abstract
We propose an endogenous architecture where a market designer can impose arbitrary restrictions on the price space, the capacity structure, the entitlement structure, and the rationing system (the architectural components). This not only generates a specific matching model, but it also endogenously generates an equilibrium concept, a domain of preference profiles, and a matching mechanism (the architectural structure). For almost any imposed restrictions, the endogenously generated mechanism is non-manipulable on the endogenously generated domain of preference profiles. The proposed endogenous architecture resolve themarket design puzzle by demonstrating that seemingly disparate matching models, including
many of the classic... (More)
We propose an endogenous architecture where a market designer can impose arbitrary restrictions on the price space, the capacity structure, the entitlement structure, and the rationing system (the architectural components). This not only generates a specific matching model, but it also endogenously generates an equilibrium concept, a domain of preference profiles, and a matching mechanism (the architectural structure). For almost any imposed restrictions, the endogenously generated mechanism is non-manipulable on the endogenously generated domain of preference profiles. The proposed endogenous architecture resolve themarket design puzzle by demonstrating that seemingly disparate matching models, including
many of the classic applications, are part of the same unifying architecture. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
; ; and
organization
publishing date
type
Working paper/Preprint
publication status
published
subject
keywords
endogenous architecture, architectural components, architectural structure, general matching framework, weak equilibrium, non-manipulability
in
Working Papers
issue
2026:7
pages
45 pages
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
63e8e89c-f22f-48a6-9dd1-61ebc01f1e67
date added to LUP
2026-08-14 11:15:20
date last changed
2026-08-17 08:56:20
@misc{63e8e89c-f22f-48a6-9dd1-61ebc01f1e67,
  abstract     = {{We propose an endogenous architecture where a market designer can impose arbitrary restrictions on the price space, the capacity structure, the entitlement structure, and the rationing system (the architectural components). This not only generates a specific matching model, but it also endogenously generates an equilibrium concept, a domain of preference profiles, and a matching mechanism (the architectural structure). For almost any imposed restrictions, the endogenously generated mechanism is non-manipulable on the endogenously generated domain of preference profiles. The proposed endogenous architecture resolve themarket design puzzle by demonstrating that seemingly disparate matching models, including<br/>many of the classic applications, are part of the same unifying architecture.}},
  author       = {{Andersson, Tommy and Ehlers, Lars and Tierney, Ryan and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar}},
  keywords     = {{endogenous architecture; architectural components; architectural structure; general matching framework; weak equilibrium; non-manipulability}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Working Paper}},
  number       = {{2026:7}},
  series       = {{Working Papers}},
  title        = {{The Endogenous Architecture for Two-Sided Matching Markets}},
  url          = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/258237728/WP26_7.pdf}},
  year         = {{2026}},
}