Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets
(2018) In Working Papers- Abstract
- A time bank is a group of individuals and/or organizations in a local community that set up a common platform to trade services among themselves. There are several well-known problems associated with this type of banking, e.g., high overhead costs for record keeping and difficulties to identify feasible trades. This paper demonstrates that these problems can be solved by organizing time banks as a centralized matching market and, more specifically, by organizing trades based on a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and time-balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the members of the time bank (and those allocations are efficient). Such a mechanism does not exist on the general preference domain but on... (More)
- A time bank is a group of individuals and/or organizations in a local community that set up a common platform to trade services among themselves. There are several well-known problems associated with this type of banking, e.g., high overhead costs for record keeping and difficulties to identify feasible trades. This paper demonstrates that these problems can be solved by organizing time banks as a centralized matching market and, more specifically, by organizing trades based on a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and time-balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the members of the time bank (and those allocations are efficient). Such a mechanism does not exist on the general preference domain but on a smaller yet natural domain where agents classify services as unacceptable and acceptable (and for those services agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs). On the general preference domain, it is demonstrated that the proposed mechanism at least can prevent some groups of agents from manipulating the mechanism without dispensing individual rationality, efficiency, or time-balance. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/6ca35dce-2508-4c3d-97d8-78fb8796b052
- author
- Andersson, Tommy LU ; Csehz, Ágnes ; Ehlers, Lars Hermann LU and Erlanson, Albin LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2018
- type
- Working paper/Preprint
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- market design, time banking, priority mechanism, non-manipulability, D47, D82
- in
- Working Papers
- issue
- 2018:19
- pages
- 25 pages
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 6ca35dce-2508-4c3d-97d8-78fb8796b052
- alternative location
- https://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2018_019.htm
- date added to LUP
- 2018-09-04 15:43:39
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 21:41:25
@misc{6ca35dce-2508-4c3d-97d8-78fb8796b052,
abstract = {{A time bank is a group of individuals and/or organizations in a local community that set up a common platform to trade services among themselves. There are several well-known problems associated with this type of banking, e.g., high overhead costs for record keeping and difficulties to identify feasible trades. This paper demonstrates that these problems can be solved by organizing time banks as a centralized matching market and, more specifically, by organizing trades based on a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and time-balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the members of the time bank (and those allocations are efficient). Such a mechanism does not exist on the general preference domain but on a smaller yet natural domain where agents classify services as unacceptable and acceptable (and for those services agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs). On the general preference domain, it is demonstrated that the proposed mechanism at least can prevent some groups of agents from manipulating the mechanism without dispensing individual rationality, efficiency, or time-balance.}},
author = {{Andersson, Tommy and Csehz, Ágnes and Ehlers, Lars Hermann and Erlanson, Albin}},
keywords = {{market design; time banking; priority mechanism; non-manipulability; D47; D82}},
language = {{eng}},
note = {{Working Paper}},
number = {{2018:19}},
series = {{Working Papers}},
title = {{Organizing Time Banks: Lessons from Matching Markets}},
url = {{https://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2018_019.htm}},
year = {{2018}},
}