Extending autonomy by substituting judgment: A case of mistaken identity
(2007) p.1-25- Abstract
- According to the so-called Substituted Judgment Standard, a surrogate decision maker, acting on behalf of an incompetent patient, ought to make that health care decision which the patient would have made, had the latter been competent. The most common way of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard is to maintain that this standard extends patients’ opportunities for self-determination to situations where they are no longer able to exercise the right to autonomy on their own. In this paper we question this justification by arguing that the most frequently suggested moral reasons for allowing and encouraging people to make their own choices do not seem to apply when the patient’s decision-making is merely hypothetical. We end with some... (More)
- According to the so-called Substituted Judgment Standard, a surrogate decision maker, acting on behalf of an incompetent patient, ought to make that health care decision which the patient would have made, had the latter been competent. The most common way of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard is to maintain that this standard extends patients’ opportunities for self-determination to situations where they are no longer able to exercise the right to autonomy on their own. In this paper we question this justification by arguing that the most frequently suggested moral reasons for allowing and encouraging people to make their own choices do not seem to apply when the patient’s decision-making is merely hypothetical. We end with some brief sketches of possible alternative ways of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/739056
- author
- Broström, Linus LU and Johansson, Mats LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2007
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- self-determination, surrogate decision making, substituted judgment, autonomy, substituted judgment standard
- host publication
- The Substituted Judgment Standard. Studies on the Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making
- pages
- 1 - 25
- publisher
- Faculty of Medicine, Lund University
- ISSN
- 1652-8220
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 22a6e85b-938e-45a4-81c4-4b9cece3e036 (old id 739056)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 16:44:03
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 20:43:47
@inbook{22a6e85b-938e-45a4-81c4-4b9cece3e036, abstract = {{According to the so-called Substituted Judgment Standard, a surrogate decision maker, acting on behalf of an incompetent patient, ought to make that health care decision which the patient would have made, had the latter been competent. The most common way of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard is to maintain that this standard extends patients’ opportunities for self-determination to situations where they are no longer able to exercise the right to autonomy on their own. In this paper we question this justification by arguing that the most frequently suggested moral reasons for allowing and encouraging people to make their own choices do not seem to apply when the patient’s decision-making is merely hypothetical. We end with some brief sketches of possible alternative ways of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard.}}, author = {{Broström, Linus and Johansson, Mats}}, booktitle = {{The Substituted Judgment Standard. Studies on the Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making}}, issn = {{1652-8220}}, keywords = {{self-determination; surrogate decision making; substituted judgment; autonomy; substituted judgment standard}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{1--25}}, publisher = {{Faculty of Medicine, Lund University}}, title = {{Extending autonomy by substituting judgment: A case of mistaken identity}}, year = {{2007}}, }