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Extending autonomy by substituting judgment: A case of mistaken identity

Broström, Linus LU and Johansson, Mats LU (2007) In The Substituted Judgment Standard. Studies on the Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making p.1-25
Abstract
According to the so-called Substituted Judgment Standard, a surrogate decision maker, acting on behalf of an incompetent patient, ought to make that health care decision which the patient would have made, had the latter been competent. The most common way of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard is to maintain that this standard extends patients’ opportunities for self-determination to situations where they are no longer able to exercise the right to autonomy on their own. In this paper we question this justification by arguing that the most frequently suggested moral reasons for allowing and encouraging people to make their own choices do not seem to apply when the patient’s decision-making is merely hypothetical. We end with some... (More)
According to the so-called Substituted Judgment Standard, a surrogate decision maker, acting on behalf of an incompetent patient, ought to make that health care decision which the patient would have made, had the latter been competent. The most common way of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard is to maintain that this standard extends patients’ opportunities for self-determination to situations where they are no longer able to exercise the right to autonomy on their own. In this paper we question this justification by arguing that the most frequently suggested moral reasons for allowing and encouraging people to make their own choices do not seem to apply when the patient’s decision-making is merely hypothetical. We end with some brief sketches of possible alternative ways of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
publication status
published
subject
keywords
self-determination, surrogate decision making, substituted judgment, autonomy, substituted judgment standard
in
The Substituted Judgment Standard. Studies on the Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making
pages
1 - 25
publisher
Faculty of Medicine, Lund University
ISSN
1652-8220
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
22a6e85b-938e-45a4-81c4-4b9cece3e036 (old id 739056)
date added to LUP
2007-12-11 13:46:42
date last changed
2016-04-16 04:48:01
@inbook{22a6e85b-938e-45a4-81c4-4b9cece3e036,
  abstract     = {According to the so-called Substituted Judgment Standard, a surrogate decision maker, acting on behalf of an incompetent patient, ought to make that health care decision which the patient would have made, had the latter been competent. The most common way of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard is to maintain that this standard extends patients’ opportunities for self-determination to situations where they are no longer able to exercise the right to autonomy on their own. In this paper we question this justification by arguing that the most frequently suggested moral reasons for allowing and encouraging people to make their own choices do not seem to apply when the patient’s decision-making is merely hypothetical. We end with some brief sketches of possible alternative ways of justifying the Substituted Judgment Standard.},
  author       = {Broström, Linus and Johansson, Mats},
  issn         = {1652-8220},
  keyword      = {self-determination,surrogate decision making,substituted judgment,autonomy,substituted judgment standard},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {1--25},
  publisher    = {Faculty of Medicine, Lund University},
  series       = {The Substituted Judgment Standard. Studies on the Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making},
  title        = {Extending autonomy by substituting judgment: A case of mistaken identity},
  year         = {2007},
}