An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy-free and budget-balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
(2022) In International Journal of Economic Theory 18(1). p.50-60- Abstract
We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/8106de6f-cf72-44cb-805e-2ad81992e518
- author
- Andersson, Tommy LU and Ehlers, Lars LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2022
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- algorithm, budget-balance, envy-freeness, least manipulable
- in
- International Journal of Economic Theory
- volume
- 18
- issue
- 1
- pages
- 50 - 60
- publisher
- Wiley-Blackwell
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85103094655
- ISSN
- 1742-7355
- DOI
- 10.1111/ijet.12300
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 8106de6f-cf72-44cb-805e-2ad81992e518
- date added to LUP
- 2021-04-08 12:27:39
- date last changed
- 2022-06-29 12:50:20
@article{8106de6f-cf72-44cb-805e-2ad81992e518, abstract = {{<p>We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations.</p>}}, author = {{Andersson, Tommy and Ehlers, Lars}}, issn = {{1742-7355}}, keywords = {{algorithm; budget-balance; envy-freeness; least manipulable}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{50--60}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, series = {{International Journal of Economic Theory}}, title = {{An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy-free and budget-balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12300}}, doi = {{10.1111/ijet.12300}}, volume = {{18}}, year = {{2022}}, }