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An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy-free and budget-balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities

Andersson, Tommy LU and Ehlers, Lars LU (2022) In International Journal of Economic Theory 18(1). p.50-60
Abstract

We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations.

Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
algorithm, budget-balance, envy-freeness, least manipulable
in
International Journal of Economic Theory
volume
18
issue
1
pages
50 - 60
publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
external identifiers
  • scopus:85103094655
ISSN
1742-7355
DOI
10.1111/ijet.12300
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
8106de6f-cf72-44cb-805e-2ad81992e518
date added to LUP
2021-04-08 12:27:39
date last changed
2022-06-29 12:50:20
@article{8106de6f-cf72-44cb-805e-2ad81992e518,
  abstract     = {{<p>We analyze the problem of allocating indivisible objects and monetary compensations to a set of agents. In particular, we consider envy-free and budget-balanced rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. A key observation is that, for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via so-called agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations. Given this observation, we provide an algorithm for identifying agent- (Formula presented.) -linked allocations.</p>}},
  author       = {{Andersson, Tommy and Ehlers, Lars}},
  issn         = {{1742-7355}},
  keywords     = {{algorithm; budget-balance; envy-freeness; least manipulable}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{50--60}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
  series       = {{International Journal of Economic Theory}},
  title        = {{An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy-free and budget-balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12300}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/ijet.12300}},
  volume       = {{18}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}