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Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions

Andersson, Tommy LU and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU (2018) In Games and Economic Behavior 107. p.41-59
Abstract
This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets... (More)
This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
rationing price equilibrium, (extended) english price sequences, iterative English auction rule, C78, D44, D45
in
Games and Economic Behavior
volume
107
pages
19 pages
publisher
0899-8256
external identifiers
  • scopus:85034630340
ISSN
0899-8256
DOI
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
818164b5-bcf6-42d0-94d6-91525188d236
date added to LUP
2017-11-13 10:45:49
date last changed
2018-05-29 10:00:48
@article{818164b5-bcf6-42d0-94d6-91525188d236,
  abstract     = {This paper considers a housing market with price restrictions. On such market, price equilibrium may be excluded for certain preference profiles. However, the existence of a unique minimal rationing price equilibrium has previously been established on a general preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. This type of equilibrium has been demonstrated to be an important ingredient in a direct and strategy-proof allocation mechanism for housing markets with price restrictions. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a finite ascending price sequence that terminates to a minimal rationing price equilibrium. This sequence is demonstrated to play a key-role in an Iterative English Auction Rule for housing markets with price restrictions.},
  author       = {Andersson, Tommy and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar},
  issn         = {0899-8256},
  keyword      = {rationing price equilibrium,(extended) english price sequences,iterative English auction rule,C78,D44,D45},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {41--59},
  publisher    = {0899-8256},
  series       = {Games and Economic Behavior},
  title        = {Sequential Rules for House Allocation with Price Restrictions},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/},
  volume       = {107},
  year         = {2018},
}