Venting and Gossiping in Conflicts: Emotion Expression in Ultimatum Games
(2015) In Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University- Abstract
- Conflicts often lead to expression of emotion to unrelated parties. We study non-instrumental emotion expression in binary ultimatum games, where receivers can express emotion either privately or to a third-party audience prior to accepting or rejecting the offer. The possibility of emotion expression to an audience increases welfare, but this is driven by senders behaving more fairly rather than any change in receivers' behaviour. We thus show that the role of emotion expression in increasing co-operation is mainly driven by the punishment motive. There is demand for emotion expression even when it is unobserved, this is motivated by low self-esteem.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/8230896
- author
- Samahita, Margaret LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2015
- type
- Working paper/Preprint
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- self-esteem, fairness, emotion, co-operation, ultimatum game
- in
- Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University
- issue
- 33
- pages
- 27 pages
- publisher
- Department of Economics, Lund University
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 4eb9ed66-5e43-4418-b977-42228e2d0d40 (old id 8230896)
- alternative location
- http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2015_033.htm
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 11:18:35
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 21:03:59
@misc{4eb9ed66-5e43-4418-b977-42228e2d0d40, abstract = {{Conflicts often lead to expression of emotion to unrelated parties. We study non-instrumental emotion expression in binary ultimatum games, where receivers can express emotion either privately or to a third-party audience prior to accepting or rejecting the offer. The possibility of emotion expression to an audience increases welfare, but this is driven by senders behaving more fairly rather than any change in receivers' behaviour. We thus show that the role of emotion expression in increasing co-operation is mainly driven by the punishment motive. There is demand for emotion expression even when it is unobserved, this is motivated by low self-esteem.}}, author = {{Samahita, Margaret}}, keywords = {{self-esteem; fairness; emotion; co-operation; ultimatum game}}, language = {{eng}}, note = {{Working Paper}}, number = {{33}}, publisher = {{Department of Economics, Lund University}}, series = {{Working Paper / Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University}}, title = {{Venting and Gossiping in Conflicts: Emotion Expression in Ultimatum Games}}, url = {{http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2015_033.htm}}, year = {{2015}}, }