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Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices

Andersson, Tommy LU ; Ehlers, Lars LU and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU (2020) In Working Papers
Abstract
We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and money. On this market, each house is initially owned (or rented) by some agent and each agent demands precisely one house. The problem is to identify the complete set of direct allocation mechanisms that can be used to reallocate the houses among the agents. The focus is on price mechanisms, i.e., mappings of preference profiles to price equilibria, that are strategy-proof and satisfy an individual rationality condition. We prove that the only mechanism that satisfies these conditions is a price mechanism with a minimal equilibrium price vector. The result is not true in full preference domain. Instead, we identify a smaller domain, that contains almost all profiles, where... (More)
We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and money. On this market, each house is initially owned (or rented) by some agent and each agent demands precisely one house. The problem is to identify the complete set of direct allocation mechanisms that can be used to reallocate the houses among the agents. The focus is on price mechanisms, i.e., mappings of preference profiles to price equilibria, that are strategy-proof and satisfy an individual rationality condition. We prove that the only mechanism that satisfies these conditions is a price mechanism with a minimal equilibrium price vector. The result is not true in full preference domain. Instead, we identify a smaller domain, that contains almost all profiles, where the result holds. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
; and
organization
publishing date
type
Working paper/Preprint
publication status
published
subject
keywords
public housing, existing tenants, equilibrium, minimum equilibrium prices, domain, C71, C78, D71, D78
in
Working Papers
issue
2020:28
pages
18 pages
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
8d9595b9-3d10-4ad7-b98c-f23092610ff2
alternative location
https://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2020_028.htm
date added to LUP
2021-01-25 15:45:23
date last changed
2021-01-25 15:45:23
@misc{8d9595b9-3d10-4ad7-b98c-f23092610ff2,
  abstract     = {{We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and money. On this market, each house is initially owned (or rented) by some agent and each agent demands precisely one house. The problem is to identify the complete set of direct allocation mechanisms that can be used to reallocate the houses among the agents. The focus is on price mechanisms, i.e., mappings of preference profiles to price equilibria, that are strategy-proof and satisfy an individual rationality condition. We prove that the only mechanism that satisfies these conditions is a price mechanism with a minimal equilibrium price vector. The result is not true in full preference domain. Instead, we identify a smaller domain, that contains almost all profiles, where the result holds.}},
  author       = {{Andersson, Tommy and Ehlers, Lars and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar}},
  keywords     = {{public housing; existing tenants; equilibrium; minimum equilibrium prices; domain; C71; C78; D71; D78}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Working Paper}},
  number       = {{2020:28}},
  series       = {{Working Papers}},
  title        = {{Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices}},
  url          = {{https://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2020_028.htm}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}