Experience without self : Phenomenology and neural correlates of selflessness
(2023)- Abstract
- The present dissertation project concerns the relationship between self and consciousness. Specifically, it concerns the phenomenal sense of self and if this is a necessary component of all experience or not. What is it to have a sense of self? This can refer to several things, such as the sense of being a continuous person through time, the sense of having a body, the sense of being in control of your actions, the sense of being located in a specific place, or the sense of being a recipient of experiences. All these aspects have in common a sense of separation or duality between self and not-self.
In order to answer the overarching question about whether there can be experience without self, I present three papers. For Paper I,... (More) - The present dissertation project concerns the relationship between self and consciousness. Specifically, it concerns the phenomenal sense of self and if this is a necessary component of all experience or not. What is it to have a sense of self? This can refer to several things, such as the sense of being a continuous person through time, the sense of having a body, the sense of being in control of your actions, the sense of being located in a specific place, or the sense of being a recipient of experiences. All these aspects have in common a sense of separation or duality between self and not-self.
In order to answer the overarching question about whether there can be experience without self, I present three papers. For Paper I, I interviewed persons who had undergone self-transcendent experiences – transient episodes of strong alterations of the sense of self that can be induced by, for example, meditation or psychedelic drugs. The aim was to identify which of the various aspects of self that were reported to be changed or lost during the experience. For Paper II, I interviewed persons with varying meditation background about their sense of self in everyday life. Here, the aim was mainly to explore the sense of being a recipient of experiences, what is referred to here as perspectival ownership of experience, and how this relates to other aspects of self. Paper III is a brain imaging study, where participants interviewed for Paper II underwent brain scanning (fMRI) while resting and performing two tasks. The aim was to look for neural correlates of various aspects of self.
Paper I showed that the self reported to be altered or lost in self-transcendent experiences can encompass one or several aspects of self in different combinations. One conclusion was that studies that investigate altered self-experiences ought to define better the exact aspect of self that is targeted, as terms such as “ego-dissolution” can refer to many different things. Paper II revealed that perspectival ownership of experience showed a quadratic relation to the general level of selflessness in everyday life, so that participants in the middle range of selflessness described a salient sense of being a recipient of experiences, whereas participants in both the low and high end of selflessness did not. Paper III revealed quadratic relations between brain data and overall selflessness, for example so that connectivity within the brain’s default mode network was higher for participants in either end of selflessness compared to those in between.
In conclusion, this project adds to the understanding of the relationship between self and consciousness through exemplifying experiences lacking one or several aspects of self and clarifying the relationship between these aspects, a relation that – it seems – is not necessarily linear.
(Less) - Abstract (Swedish)
- Det här avhandlingsprojektet handlar om självmedvetande och hur det förhåller sig till medvetande i stort. Mer specifikt handlar det om jagupplevelse, känslan av att vara ett jag, och om denna känsla med nödvändighet finns med i alla våra upplevelser eller inte. Vad betyder det då att ha en känsla av att vara ett jag? Det kan betyda flera saker, exempelvis känslan av att vara samma person över tid, känslan av att ha en kropp, känslan av att kontrollera sina handlingar, känslan av att befinna sig på en viss plats, eller känslan av att vara en mottagare av upplevelser. Alla dessa aspekter har som gemensam faktor en känsla av separation eller dualitet mellan jag och icke-jag.
För att svara på den övergripande frågan om det kan... (More) - Det här avhandlingsprojektet handlar om självmedvetande och hur det förhåller sig till medvetande i stort. Mer specifikt handlar det om jagupplevelse, känslan av att vara ett jag, och om denna känsla med nödvändighet finns med i alla våra upplevelser eller inte. Vad betyder det då att ha en känsla av att vara ett jag? Det kan betyda flera saker, exempelvis känslan av att vara samma person över tid, känslan av att ha en kropp, känslan av att kontrollera sina handlingar, känslan av att befinna sig på en viss plats, eller känslan av att vara en mottagare av upplevelser. Alla dessa aspekter har som gemensam faktor en känsla av separation eller dualitet mellan jag och icke-jag.
För att svara på den övergripande frågan om det kan finnas upplevelse utan jagupplevelse presenterar jag tre artiklar. För artikel I intervjuade jag personer som haft så kallade självtranscendenta upplevelser – kortvariga episoder av kraftigt förändrad jagupplevelse som kan induceras av exempelvis meditation eller psykedeliska droger. Målet var att identifiera vilken eller vilka aspekter av jaget som beskrevs som förändrade eller frånvarande under upplevelsen. För artikel II intervjuade jag personer med varierande erfarenhet av meditation om deras jagupplevelse i vardagen. Här var målet framför allt att undersöka känslan av att vara en mottagare av upplevelser, som i det här projektet kallas perspectival ownership of experience, och hur denna känsla förhåller sig till andra aspekter av jagupplevelse. Artikel III är en hjärnavbildningsstudie där deltagare från artikel II scannades med fMRI medan de vilade och utförde två uppgifter. Syftet var att leta efter hjärnkorrelat till olika typer av jagupplevelse.
Artikel I visade att den jagupplevelse som förändras eller försvinner i självtranscendenta upplevelser kan omfatta en eller flera aspekter i olika kombinationer. En slutsats blev att studier som undersöker förändrad jagupplevelse bör definiera tydligare vilken aspekt av jagupplevelse de undersöker, eftersom ord som “egodöd” kan referera till många olika saker. Artikel II visade en kvadratisk relation mellan perspectival ownership of experience och en övergripande känsla av jaglöshet i vardagen, så att personer i mittspannet av jaglöshet beskrev en tydlig känsla av att vara en mottagare av upplevelser medan personer med låg respektive hög känsla av jaglöshet inte gjorde det. Artikel III visade på kvadratiska relationer mellan hjärndata och övergripande jaglöshet i samma deltagargrupp, exempelvis i att konnektiviteten inom hjärnans standardnätverk var högre för deltagare i respektive ände av jaglöshet än för de i mitten.
Sammanfattningsvis bidrar projektet till förståelsen av relationen mellan självmedvetande och medvetande genom att exemplifiera upplevelser utan en eller flera aspekter av jag och förtydliga relationen dem emellan, en relation som – vad det verkar – inte med nödvändighet är linjär.
(Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/8f0b39ff-7119-4709-9b29-823831d72013
- author
- Lindström, Lena LU
- supervisor
- opponent
-
- Docent Jylkkä, Jussi, University of Turku, Finland
- organization
- alternative title
- Upplevelse utan jagupplevelse : Fenomenologi och neurala korrelat för jaglöshet
- publishing date
- 2023-05-16
- type
- Thesis
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- sense of self, self-consciousness, self-transcendence, neurophenomenology, self-boundaries, perspectival ownership of experience, DMN, fMRI, sense of self, self-consciousness, self-transcendence, neurophenomenology, self-boundaries, perspectival ownership of experience, DMN, fMRI
- pages
- 87 pages
- publisher
- MediaTryck Lund
- defense location
- Sh128, Allhelgona Kyrkogata 8, Lund
- defense date
- 2023-06-20 10:00:00
- ISBN
- 978-91-8039-657-8
- 978-91-8039-658-5
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 8f0b39ff-7119-4709-9b29-823831d72013
- date added to LUP
- 2023-05-16 09:50:58
- date last changed
- 2023-05-22 08:16:07
@phdthesis{8f0b39ff-7119-4709-9b29-823831d72013,
abstract = {{The present dissertation project concerns the relationship between self and consciousness. Specifically, it concerns the phenomenal sense of self and if this is a necessary component of all experience or not. What is it to have a sense of self? This can refer to several things, such as the sense of being a continuous person through time, the sense of having a body, the sense of being in control of your actions, the sense of being located in a specific place, or the sense of being a recipient of experiences. All these aspects have in common a sense of separation or duality between self and not-self. <br/><br/>In order to answer the overarching question about whether there can be experience without self, I present three papers. For Paper I, I interviewed persons who had undergone self-transcendent experiences – transient episodes of strong alterations of the sense of self that can be induced by, for example, meditation or psychedelic drugs. The aim was to identify which of the various aspects of self that were reported to be changed or lost during the experience. For Paper II, I interviewed persons with varying meditation background about their sense of self in everyday life. Here, the aim was mainly to explore the sense of being a recipient of experiences, what is referred to here as perspectival ownership of experience, and how this relates to other aspects of self. Paper III is a brain imaging study, where participants interviewed for Paper II underwent brain scanning (fMRI) while resting and performing two tasks. The aim was to look for neural correlates of various aspects of self. <br/><br/>Paper I showed that the self reported to be altered or lost in self-transcendent experiences can encompass one or several aspects of self in different combinations. One conclusion was that studies that investigate altered self-experiences ought to define better the exact aspect of self that is targeted, as terms such as “ego-dissolution” can refer to many different things. Paper II revealed that perspectival ownership of experience showed a quadratic relation to the general level of selflessness in everyday life, so that participants in the middle range of selflessness described a salient sense of being a recipient of experiences, whereas participants in both the low and high end of selflessness did not. Paper III revealed quadratic relations between brain data and overall selflessness, for example so that connectivity within the brain’s default mode network was higher for participants in either end of selflessness compared to those in between. <br/><br/>In conclusion, this project adds to the understanding of the relationship between self and consciousness through exemplifying experiences lacking one or several aspects of self and clarifying the relationship between these aspects, a relation that – it seems – is not necessarily linear.<br/>}},
author = {{Lindström, Lena}},
isbn = {{978-91-8039-657-8}},
keywords = {{sense of self; self-consciousness; self-transcendence; neurophenomenology; self-boundaries; perspectival ownership of experience; DMN; fMRI; sense of self; self-consciousness; self-transcendence; neurophenomenology; self-boundaries; perspectival ownership of experience; DMN; fMRI}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{05}},
publisher = {{MediaTryck Lund}},
school = {{Lund University}},
title = {{Experience without self : Phenomenology and neural correlates of selflessness}},
url = {{https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/files/146654414/Experience_without_self.pdf}},
year = {{2023}},
}