Georgian Orthodox Church: Whither the foreign policy role?
(2018) In Civil Georgia- Abstract
- Liberal minority of the Georgian population views the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) as an obstacle to country’s progress. Overwhelming majority of GOC’s influential clerics are (fairly) seen as resistant to the idea(l)s of equality between sexes and gender, individual liberties and generally to critical thinking. The majority of Georgians considers GOC as the most trusted institution, making patriarch Ilia the most trusted man in Georgia.
The issue of identity: “Georgianness” as the religious hierarchs and conservative politicians like to call it, has been central for the GOC’s political operation. In most cases, this has been directed against minorities.
The three largest (by estimated number of participants) protests... (More) - Liberal minority of the Georgian population views the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) as an obstacle to country’s progress. Overwhelming majority of GOC’s influential clerics are (fairly) seen as resistant to the idea(l)s of equality between sexes and gender, individual liberties and generally to critical thinking. The majority of Georgians considers GOC as the most trusted institution, making patriarch Ilia the most trusted man in Georgia.
The issue of identity: “Georgianness” as the religious hierarchs and conservative politicians like to call it, has been central for the GOC’s political operation. In most cases, this has been directed against minorities.
The three largest (by estimated number of participants) protests led and organized by GOC during the last 10 years from Russian invasion were held against the Law on Registration of Religious Minority Organizations (2011), the Law on Self-governance (2013) and against sexual liberty: a violent action against LGBTI activists on May 17, 2013.
If GOC indeed cares about the loss of Georgian identity, we may pose question why does its establishment interpret religious, gender or sexual liberties as more threatening to “Georgianness” than Russia’s occupation, as well as the ongoing borderization policy under which Georgia lost 151 settlements (135 in Tskhinvali region and 16 in Kodori Valley) since the end of the 2008 war?
This begs a central question: can GOC ally with the state in pursuing the national security agenda? And given the issues it widely protested against until today, would it? (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/ae517118-2aeb-429d-8ddf-1fb77da7d558
- author
- Metreveli, Tornike LU
- publishing date
- 2018-07-26
- type
- Contribution to specialist publication or newspaper
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Georgian Orthodox Church, Eastern Christianity, religion and state
- categories
- Popular Science
- in
- Civil Georgia
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- ae517118-2aeb-429d-8ddf-1fb77da7d558
- alternative location
- https://civil.ge/archives/247434
- date added to LUP
- 2021-01-12 11:07:24
- date last changed
- 2021-03-09 12:35:56
@article{ae517118-2aeb-429d-8ddf-1fb77da7d558, abstract = {{Liberal minority of the Georgian population views the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) as an obstacle to country’s progress. Overwhelming majority of GOC’s influential clerics are (fairly) seen as resistant to the idea(l)s of equality between sexes and gender, individual liberties and generally to critical thinking. The majority of Georgians considers GOC as the most trusted institution, making patriarch Ilia the most trusted man in Georgia.<br/><br/>The issue of identity: “Georgianness” as the religious hierarchs and conservative politicians like to call it, has been central for the GOC’s political operation. In most cases, this has been directed against minorities.<br/><br/>The three largest (by estimated number of participants) protests led and organized by GOC during the last 10 years from Russian invasion were held against the Law on Registration of Religious Minority Organizations (2011), the Law on Self-governance (2013) and against sexual liberty: a violent action against LGBTI activists on May 17, 2013.<br/>If GOC indeed cares about the loss of Georgian identity, we may pose question why does its establishment interpret religious, gender or sexual liberties as more threatening to “Georgianness” than Russia’s occupation, as well as the ongoing borderization policy under which Georgia lost 151 settlements (135 in Tskhinvali region and 16 in Kodori Valley) since the end of the 2008 war?<br/>This begs a central question: can GOC ally with the state in pursuing the national security agenda? And given the issues it widely protested against until today, would it?}}, author = {{Metreveli, Tornike}}, keywords = {{Georgian Orthodox Church; Eastern Christianity; religion and state}}, language = {{eng}}, month = {{07}}, series = {{Civil Georgia}}, title = {{Georgian Orthodox Church: Whither the foreign policy role?}}, url = {{https://civil.ge/archives/247434}}, year = {{2018}}, }