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Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games

Mohlin, Erik LU ; Östling, Robert and Wang, Joseph Tao yi (2020) In Games and Economic Behavior 120. p.225-245
Abstract

We study a simple model of similarity-based global cumulative imitation in symmetric games with large and ordered strategy sets and a salient winning player. We show that the learning model explains behavior well in both field and laboratory data from one such “winner-takes-all” game: the lowest unique positive integer game in which the player that chose the lowest number not chosen by anyone else wins a fixed prize. We corroborate this finding in three other winner-takes-all games and discuss under what conditions the model may be applicable beyond this class of games. Theoretically, we show that global cumulative imitation without similarity weighting results in a version of the replicator dynamic in winner-takes-all games.

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author
; and
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Beauty contest, Behavioral game theory, Evolutionary game theory, Imitation, Learning, Lowest unique positive integer game, Mixed equilibrium, Replicator dynamic, Similarity-based reasoning, Stochastic approximation
in
Games and Economic Behavior
volume
120
pages
21 pages
publisher
0899-8256
external identifiers
  • scopus:85078682490
ISSN
0899-8256
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.008
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
dde6ebcc-b62d-4992-9aa1-9f8ac277d07c
date added to LUP
2020-02-11 12:49:20
date last changed
2022-04-18 20:42:03
@article{dde6ebcc-b62d-4992-9aa1-9f8ac277d07c,
  abstract     = {{<p>We study a simple model of similarity-based global cumulative imitation in symmetric games with large and ordered strategy sets and a salient winning player. We show that the learning model explains behavior well in both field and laboratory data from one such “winner-takes-all” game: the lowest unique positive integer game in which the player that chose the lowest number not chosen by anyone else wins a fixed prize. We corroborate this finding in three other winner-takes-all games and discuss under what conditions the model may be applicable beyond this class of games. Theoretically, we show that global cumulative imitation without similarity weighting results in a version of the replicator dynamic in winner-takes-all games.</p>}},
  author       = {{Mohlin, Erik and Östling, Robert and Wang, Joseph Tao yi}},
  issn         = {{0899-8256}},
  keywords     = {{Beauty contest; Behavioral game theory; Evolutionary game theory; Imitation; Learning; Lowest unique positive integer game; Mixed equilibrium; Replicator dynamic; Similarity-based reasoning; Stochastic approximation}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  pages        = {{225--245}},
  publisher    = {{0899-8256}},
  series       = {{Games and Economic Behavior}},
  title        = {{Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.008}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.008}},
  volume       = {{120}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}