Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games
(2020) In Games and Economic Behavior 120. p.225-245- Abstract
We study a simple model of similarity-based global cumulative imitation in symmetric games with large and ordered strategy sets and a salient winning player. We show that the learning model explains behavior well in both field and laboratory data from one such “winner-takes-all” game: the lowest unique positive integer game in which the player that chose the lowest number not chosen by anyone else wins a fixed prize. We corroborate this finding in three other winner-takes-all games and discuss under what conditions the model may be applicable beyond this class of games. Theoretically, we show that global cumulative imitation without similarity weighting results in a version of the replicator dynamic in winner-takes-all games.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/dde6ebcc-b62d-4992-9aa1-9f8ac277d07c
- author
- Mohlin, Erik LU ; Östling, Robert and Wang, Joseph Tao yi
- organization
- publishing date
- 2020-03
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Beauty contest, Behavioral game theory, Evolutionary game theory, Imitation, Learning, Lowest unique positive integer game, Mixed equilibrium, Replicator dynamic, Similarity-based reasoning, Stochastic approximation
- in
- Games and Economic Behavior
- volume
- 120
- pages
- 21 pages
- publisher
- 0899-8256
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85078682490
- ISSN
- 0899-8256
- DOI
- 10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.008
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- dde6ebcc-b62d-4992-9aa1-9f8ac277d07c
- date added to LUP
- 2020-02-11 12:49:20
- date last changed
- 2022-04-18 20:42:03
@article{dde6ebcc-b62d-4992-9aa1-9f8ac277d07c, abstract = {{<p>We study a simple model of similarity-based global cumulative imitation in symmetric games with large and ordered strategy sets and a salient winning player. We show that the learning model explains behavior well in both field and laboratory data from one such “winner-takes-all” game: the lowest unique positive integer game in which the player that chose the lowest number not chosen by anyone else wins a fixed prize. We corroborate this finding in three other winner-takes-all games and discuss under what conditions the model may be applicable beyond this class of games. Theoretically, we show that global cumulative imitation without similarity weighting results in a version of the replicator dynamic in winner-takes-all games.</p>}}, author = {{Mohlin, Erik and Östling, Robert and Wang, Joseph Tao yi}}, issn = {{0899-8256}}, keywords = {{Beauty contest; Behavioral game theory; Evolutionary game theory; Imitation; Learning; Lowest unique positive integer game; Mixed equilibrium; Replicator dynamic; Similarity-based reasoning; Stochastic approximation}}, language = {{eng}}, pages = {{225--245}}, publisher = {{0899-8256}}, series = {{Games and Economic Behavior}}, title = {{Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.008}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.008}}, volume = {{120}}, year = {{2020}}, }