Skip to main content

Lund University Publications

LUND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited

Andersson, Tommy LU and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU (2018) In Working Papers p.14-14
Abstract
We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given that restriction, the outcome prices are minimal. The domain of the mechanisms is the set of general preference profiles (R_1,R_2,…,R_n), i.e., where R_a is agent a's rational, monotonic and continuous preference ordering over objects and prices.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
and
organization
publishing date
type
Working paper/Preprint
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Characterization, House-allocation, Strategy-proofness, Multiobject auction, D44, D47, D63, D78, D82
in
Working Papers
issue
2018:21
pages
14 - 14
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
e230b278-dd6a-4a7f-a729-52fe1d450005
alternative location
https://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2018_021.htm
date added to LUP
2018-09-04 15:11:35
date last changed
2018-11-21 21:41:25
@misc{e230b278-dd6a-4a7f-a729-52fe1d450005,
  abstract     = {{We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given that restriction, the outcome prices are minimal. The domain of the mechanisms is the set of general preference profiles (R_1,R_2,…,R_n), i.e., where R_a is agent a's rational, monotonic and continuous preference ordering over objects and prices.}},
  author       = {{Andersson, Tommy and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar}},
  keywords     = {{Characterization; House-allocation; Strategy-proofness; Multiobject auction; D44; D47; D63; D78; D82}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  note         = {{Working Paper}},
  number       = {{2018:21}},
  pages        = {{14--14}},
  series       = {{Working Papers}},
  title        = {{Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited}},
  url          = {{https://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2018_021.htm}},
  year         = {{2018}},
}