Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited
(2018) In Working Papers p.14-14- Abstract
- We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given that restriction, the outcome prices are minimal. The domain of the mechanisms is the set of general preference profiles (R_1,R_2,…,R_n), i.e., where R_a is agent a's rational, monotonic and continuous preference ordering over objects and prices.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
http://lup.lub.lu.se/record/e230b278-dd6a-4a7f-a729-52fe1d450005
- author
- Andersson, Tommy ^{LU} and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar ^{LU}
- organization
- publishing date
- 2018
- type
- Working Paper
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Characterization, House-allocation, Strategy-proofness, Multiobject auction, D44, D47, D63, D78, D82
- in
- Working Papers
- issue
- 2018:21
- pages
- 14 - 14
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- e230b278-dd6a-4a7f-a729-52fe1d450005
- alternative location
- https://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2018_021.htm
- date added to LUP
- 2018-09-04 15:11:35
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 21:41:25
@misc{e230b278-dd6a-4a7f-a729-52fe1d450005, abstract = {We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special way and, given that restriction, the outcome prices are minimal. The domain of the mechanisms is the set of general preference profiles (R_1,R_2,…,R_n), i.e., where R_a is agent a's rational, monotonic and continuous preference ordering over objects and prices. }, author = {Andersson, Tommy and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar}, keyword = {Characterization,House-allocation,Strategy-proofness,Multiobject auction,D44,D47,D63,D78,D82}, language = {eng}, note = {Working Paper}, number = {2018:21}, pages = {14--14}, series = {Working Papers}, title = {Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects Revisited}, year = {2018}, }