Is moral internalism supported by folk intuitions?
(2013) In Philosophical Psychology 26(3). p.319-335- Abstract
- In the metaethical debate on moral internalism and externalism, appeal is constantly made to people’s intuitions about the connection between moral judgments and motivation. However, internalists and externalists disagree considerably about their content. In this paper, we present an empirical study of laymen’s intuitions about this connection. We found that they lend surprisingly little support to the most celebrated versions of internalism, which provide reasons to be skeptical of the evidential basis for these views.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/2295042
- author
- Strandberg, Caj LU and Björklund, Fredrik LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2013
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Internalism, Externalism, Moral Judgment, Moral Motivation, Experimental Philosophy, Intuition
- in
- Philosophical Psychology
- volume
- 26
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 319 - 335
- publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000321812000001
- scopus:84880399064
- ISSN
- 1465-394X
- DOI
- 10.1080/09515089.2012.667622
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 323d3962-d668-462c-abaa-7c2988ee54b6 (old id 2295042)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 10:34:33
- date last changed
- 2022-04-04 19:26:19
@article{323d3962-d668-462c-abaa-7c2988ee54b6, abstract = {{In the metaethical debate on moral internalism and externalism, appeal is constantly made to people’s intuitions about the connection between moral judgments and motivation. However, internalists and externalists disagree considerably about their content. In this paper, we present an empirical study of laymen’s intuitions about this connection. We found that they lend surprisingly little support to the most celebrated versions of internalism, which provide reasons to be skeptical of the evidential basis for these views.}}, author = {{Strandberg, Caj and Björklund, Fredrik}}, issn = {{1465-394X}}, keywords = {{Internalism; Externalism; Moral Judgment; Moral Motivation; Experimental Philosophy; Intuition}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{319--335}}, publisher = {{Taylor & Francis}}, series = {{Philosophical Psychology}}, title = {{Is moral internalism supported by folk intuitions?}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.667622}}, doi = {{10.1080/09515089.2012.667622}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2013}}, }