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A representation theorem for voting with logical consequences

Gärdenfors, Peter LU (2006) In Economics and Philosophy 22(2). p.181-190
Abstract
This paper concerns voting with logical consequences, which means that anybody voting for an alternative x should vote for the logical consequences of x as well. Similarly, the social choice set is also supposed to be closed under logical consequences. The central result of the paper is that, given a set of fairly natural conditions, the only social choice functions that satisfy social logical closure are oligarchic (where a subset of the voters are decisive for the social choice). The set of conditions needed for the proof include a version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives that also plays a central role in Arrow's impossibility theorem.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Economics and Philosophy
volume
22
issue
2
pages
181 - 190
publisher
Cambridge University Press
external identifiers
  • wos:000239865600001
  • scopus:33746027382
ISSN
0266-2671
DOI
10.1017/S026626710600085X
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
b8f6c051-93cd-422f-bc82-3f399092b445 (old id 686271)
date added to LUP
2016-04-01 12:20:24
date last changed
2022-03-05 22:11:22
@article{b8f6c051-93cd-422f-bc82-3f399092b445,
  abstract     = {{This paper concerns voting with logical consequences, which means that anybody voting for an alternative x should vote for the logical consequences of x as well. Similarly, the social choice set is also supposed to be closed under logical consequences. The central result of the paper is that, given a set of fairly natural conditions, the only social choice functions that satisfy social logical closure are oligarchic (where a subset of the voters are decisive for the social choice). The set of conditions needed for the proof include a version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives that also plays a central role in Arrow's impossibility theorem.}},
  author       = {{Gärdenfors, Peter}},
  issn         = {{0266-2671}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{181--190}},
  publisher    = {{Cambridge University Press}},
  series       = {{Economics and Philosophy}},
  title        = {{A representation theorem for voting with logical consequences}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S026626710600085X}},
  doi          = {{10.1017/S026626710600085X}},
  volume       = {{22}},
  year         = {{2006}},
}