Intuition and ex-post facto reasoning in moral judgment: Some experimental findings
(2004) In LPR. Lund philosophy reports 2004:1. Patterns of value. Essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2, pp 36-50.- Abstract
- Psychological theories have traditionally assumed that moral judgment is caused by a reasoning process. This idea was challenged in two experiments. In the first participants were asked to make judgments in tasks set up to produce a conflict between intuition and reason. In the second, participants made judgments of morally questionable actions that were described either in a vividly disgusting way or in a less disgusting way, to investigate the effects on moral judgment of irrelevant disgust. Results suggest that moral judgment can be based on intuition and that reasoning may serve as ex-post facto justification of the judgment.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/936073
- author
- Björklund, Fredrik LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2004
- type
- Book/Report
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- LPR. Lund philosophy reports 2004:1. Patterns of value. Essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2, pp 36-50.
- pages
- 15 pages
- publisher
- Department of Philosophy, Lund University
- report number
- 2004:1
- ISSN
- 1404-3718
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- afd54f5d-da93-42eb-843c-80d3bae1f4eb (old id 936073)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 15:48:28
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 20:36:31
@techreport{afd54f5d-da93-42eb-843c-80d3bae1f4eb, abstract = {{Psychological theories have traditionally assumed that moral judgment is caused by a reasoning process. This idea was challenged in two experiments. In the first participants were asked to make judgments in tasks set up to produce a conflict between intuition and reason. In the second, participants made judgments of morally questionable actions that were described either in a vividly disgusting way or in a less disgusting way, to investigate the effects on moral judgment of irrelevant disgust. Results suggest that moral judgment can be based on intuition and that reasoning may serve as ex-post facto justification of the judgment.}}, author = {{Björklund, Fredrik}}, institution = {{Department of Philosophy, Lund University}}, issn = {{1404-3718}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{2004:1}}, series = {{LPR. Lund philosophy reports 2004:1. Patterns of value. Essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2, pp 36-50.}}, title = {{Intuition and ex-post facto reasoning in moral judgment: Some experimental findings}}, year = {{2004}}, }