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Intuition and ex-post facto reasoning in moral judgment: Some experimental findings

Björklund, Fredrik LU (2004) In LPR. Lund philosophy reports 2004:1. Patterns of value. Essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2, pp 36-50. 2004:1.
Abstract
Psychological theories have traditionally assumed that moral judgment is caused by a reasoning process. This idea was challenged in two experiments. In the first participants were asked to make judgments in tasks set up to produce a conflict between intuition and reason. In the second, participants made judgments of morally questionable actions that were described either in a vividly disgusting way or in a less disgusting way, to investigate the effects on moral judgment of irrelevant disgust. Results suggest that moral judgment can be based on intuition and that reasoning may serve as ex-post facto justification of the judgment.
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Book/Report
publication status
published
subject
in
LPR. Lund philosophy reports 2004:1. Patterns of value. Essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2, pp 36-50.
volume
2004:1
pages
15 pages
publisher
Department of Philosophy, Lund University
ISSN
1404-3718
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
afd54f5d-da93-42eb-843c-80d3bae1f4eb (old id 936073)
date added to LUP
2008-01-23 17:15:19
date last changed
2016-07-06 17:38:04
@techreport{afd54f5d-da93-42eb-843c-80d3bae1f4eb,
  abstract     = {Psychological theories have traditionally assumed that moral judgment is caused by a reasoning process. This idea was challenged in two experiments. In the first participants were asked to make judgments in tasks set up to produce a conflict between intuition and reason. In the second, participants made judgments of morally questionable actions that were described either in a vividly disgusting way or in a less disgusting way, to investigate the effects on moral judgment of irrelevant disgust. Results suggest that moral judgment can be based on intuition and that reasoning may serve as ex-post facto justification of the judgment.},
  author       = {Björklund, Fredrik},
  institution  = {Department of Philosophy, Lund University},
  issn         = {1404-3718},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {15},
  series       = {LPR. Lund philosophy reports 2004:1. Patterns of value. Essays on formal axiology and value analysis, vol. 2, pp 36-50.},
  title        = {Intuition and ex-post facto reasoning in moral judgment: Some experimental findings},
  volume       = {2004:1},
  year         = {2004},
}