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Induction and knowledge-what

Gärdenfors, Peter LU and Stephens, Andreas LU (2018) In European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8(3). p.471-491
Abstract
Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that it cannot be reduced to knowledge-that. We support the partition of knowledge by mapping it onto the long-term memory systems: procedural, semantic and episodic memory. The second thesis... (More)
Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that it cannot be reduced to knowledge-that. We support the partition of knowledge by mapping it onto the long-term memory systems: procedural, semantic and episodic memory. The second thesis is that the role of inductive reasoning is to generate knowledge-what. We use conceptual spaces to model knowledge-what and the relations between properties and categories involved in induction. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Inductive inferences, Knowledge-what, Semantic memory, Conceptual knowledge, Naturalistic epistemology
in
European Journal for Philosophy of Science
volume
8
issue
3
pages
471 - 491
publisher
Springer Netherlands
ISSN
1879-4912
DOI
10.1007/s13194-017-0196-y
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
e3bd9e7e-6009-4144-abf1-4926e2f38a75
date added to LUP
2018-08-16 19:22:08
date last changed
2018-09-04 12:41:24
@article{e3bd9e7e-6009-4144-abf1-4926e2f38a75,
  abstract     = {Within analytic philosophy, induction has been seen as a problem concerning inferences that have been analysed as relations between sentences. In this article, we argue that induction does not primarily concern relations between sentences, but between properties and categories. We outline a new approach to induction that is based on two theses. The first thesis is epistemological. We submit that there is not only knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but also knowledge-what. Knowledge-what concerns relations between properties and categories and we argue that it cannot be reduced to knowledge-that. We support the partition of knowledge by mapping it onto the long-term memory systems: procedural, semantic and episodic memory. The second thesis is that the role of inductive reasoning is to generate knowledge-what. We use conceptual spaces to model knowledge-what and the relations between properties and categories involved in induction.},
  author       = {Gärdenfors, Peter and Stephens, Andreas},
  issn         = {1879-4912},
  keyword      = {Inductive inferences,Knowledge-what,Semantic memory,Conceptual knowledge,Naturalistic epistemology},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {3},
  pages        = {471--491},
  publisher    = {Springer Netherlands},
  series       = {European Journal for Philosophy of Science},
  title        = {Induction and knowledge-what},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13194-017-0196-y},
  volume       = {8},
  year         = {2018},
}