A representation theorem for voting with logical consequences
(2006) In Economics and Philosophy 22(2). p.181-190- Abstract
- This paper concerns voting with logical consequences, which means that anybody voting for an alternative x should vote for the logical consequences of x as well. Similarly, the social choice set is also supposed to be closed under logical consequences. The central result of the paper is that, given a set of fairly natural conditions, the only social choice functions that satisfy social logical closure are oligarchic (where a subset of the voters are decisive for the social choice). The set of conditions needed for the proof include a version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives that also plays a central role in Arrow's impossibility theorem.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/686271
- author
- Gärdenfors, Peter LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2006
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Economics and Philosophy
- volume
- 22
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 181 - 190
- publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000239865600001
- scopus:33746027382
- ISSN
- 0266-2671
- DOI
- 10.1017/S026626710600085X
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- b8f6c051-93cd-422f-bc82-3f399092b445 (old id 686271)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-01 12:20:24
- date last changed
- 2022-03-05 22:11:22
@article{b8f6c051-93cd-422f-bc82-3f399092b445, abstract = {{This paper concerns voting with logical consequences, which means that anybody voting for an alternative x should vote for the logical consequences of x as well. Similarly, the social choice set is also supposed to be closed under logical consequences. The central result of the paper is that, given a set of fairly natural conditions, the only social choice functions that satisfy social logical closure are oligarchic (where a subset of the voters are decisive for the social choice). The set of conditions needed for the proof include a version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives that also plays a central role in Arrow's impossibility theorem.}}, author = {{Gärdenfors, Peter}}, issn = {{0266-2671}}, language = {{eng}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{181--190}}, publisher = {{Cambridge University Press}}, series = {{Economics and Philosophy}}, title = {{A representation theorem for voting with logical consequences}}, url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S026626710600085X}}, doi = {{10.1017/S026626710600085X}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2006}}, }